Copy Rights Law: Author’s Rights

Introduction
There have been numerous modern predictions of the imminent demise of copyright law as an effective means of protecting creative labour . However, while practical solutions to the problem of piracy are being evolved, there is little sign of copyright law’s decline. New and more comprehensive copyright law ties have been adopted, the scope of copyright law protection has expanded and sanctions for infringement have been strengthened. Copyright and intellectual property protections in general, seem to be in rude good health.
However, this rapid development is not to be welcomed without reservation. Laws must be strong enough to foster conditions in which creative work will flourish. However, the powers granted to intellectual property owners must not be so strong that they unduly harm the public interest. This simple, but significant, point is made during the Preamble to the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty which recognised:
... the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, research and access to information ....
It can be argued that recent over-enthusiastic bolstering of intellectual property rights risks harming this ‘larger public interest’. Legislative initiatives, largely international or supra-national, have paid little attention towards the need to ensure to the balance described above is maintained.
There are a number of reasons for this. Digitisation and other technological developments have threatened the practical effectiveness of copyright law. Copying, manipulation and distribution of copyright law works have been transformed into straightforward, and common, activities. There has been an understandable desire to introduce measures ensuring a continuing incentive to produce creative works. However, in such circumstances, a view that more intellectual property is necessarily a good thing has become prevalent . This has been fostered and cultivated by organisations lobbying on behalf of right-owners. By comparison, there has been very little lobbying in favour of the more diffuse interest in access to copyright works . Law-makers have failed into their duty to protect this public interest.
Such failure derives in part from the complexities of intellectual property law and in part from a more general ‘democratic deficit’. Decisions are taken at international level and, despite consultation exercises, beyond public scrutiny. New laws result more from high-level compromise between interest groups than from a disinterested attempt to weigh up fundamental arguments about copyright policy. In addition, within the European Economic Area, harmonisation has resulted in a further tilting of the balance in favour of intellectual property owners; these are two very different traditions that of common law copyright and civil law droit d’auteur have had to be approximated. Inside the civil law tradition, right-owners have generally been accorded a high level of protection. However, there has been a corresponding unwillingness to accept works in the direction of the copyright canon unless they demonstrate a high degree of creativity. The opposite has generally been true within the common law tradition, which is less precious about, for example, compulsory licensing and moral rights, but accords protection to tremely mundane works . The model chosen for union of the two traditions has brought together the more protectionist elements of both systems the higher level of protection accorded to right-owners in civil law jurisdictions and the inclusive approach to protection adopted traditionally in common law states. The resulting impact upon the ‘balance’ of interests in copyright law is easy to discern.
In the context of this legislative failure, the task of ensuring that copyright laws (and intellectual property laws in general) do not operate against the public interest has, within the UK, fallen to the judiciary . There is ex growing evidence of judicial disquiet at the untrammelled growth in intellectual property protection described above. The extent to which judges can determine the direction taken by the law is limited by constitutional propriety. However, justification can be found for judicial activism in this area in a developing acceptance of purposive and rights-based approaches to statutory interpretation .
This review of recent developments in UK copyright law is written against this background. It aims to look back over the last year and to identify the most significant developments within this period. It also seeks to demonstrate how these developments illustrate the more general trends outlined above, in particular judicial activism in the restraint of monopoly. This year is a suitable subject for such an analysis. There have been a series of interesting decisions of the UK courts and of the Copyright Tribunal. A number are considered into the sections below, each of which focuses upon a traditional subject division within the law of copyright.It is not contended that all of the decisions support the assessment of general trends outlined above. Nevertheless, judicial concern to maintain the ‘balance between the rights of authors in the case of literary and dramatic works and the larger public interest’ is clearly discernible.

Subsistence of Copyright law
In the UK, copyright ‘subsists’ only in those forms of ‘work’ set out in the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’) . Thus, for example, copyright subsists in a label for a sweet tin (an ‘artistic work’) and in instructions for the application of fertiliser (a ‘literary work’) . However, it does not subsist in, for example, an individual but mass-produced suite of furniture or in a database which does not constitute its author’s ‘own intellectual creation of literary and dramatic works ‘. Questions of subsistence are questions as to whether a particular item is the sort of ‘work’ protected by copyright legislation. Norowzian v. Arks Limited (No.2), discussed below, raises the question of whether or not a particular experimental film is a protected ‘dramatic work’. It clearly illustrates judicial concern to prevent intellectual property rights from being expanded without clear legislative mandate.

Norowzian v. Arks Limited (No. 2)
The claimant in this case had directed a short film entitled ‘Joy’. Its most striking feature was with the intention of the actor appeared to perform sudden changes of position that could not in reality have occurred as successive movements. This effect was achieved by means of a technique called ‘jump-cutting’. This was applied on the road to the film following the recording of the actor’s actual movements. The defendants, who had seen the claimant’s film, were responsible for a film advertising Guinness. This film, called ‘Anticipation’ employed a similar ‘jump-cutting’ technique. The claimant sued for infringement of copyright, claiming that his film was protected under the CDPA as a ‘film’ and as the recording of an underlying ‘dramatic work’ .
The particular issue before Rattee J in Norowzian v. Arks Limited (No. 2) was the validity of the claim to protection of the film as a ‘dramatic work’. Having confirmed that a film can ‘fix’ a previously unrecorded dramatic work, he went on to consider the requirements for protection as a ‘dramatic work’. Referring inside the direction of the earlier decision of the Privy Council in Green v. Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand, he found that a ‘dramatic work’ had to ‘... be capable of being, physically performed’ . ‘Joy’ did not come within this definition because it was:
... as a result of the drastic editing process adopted by Mr Norowzian ... not a recording of anything that was, or could be, performed or danced by anyone .
This decision is, in some respects, rather conservative. It could be argued to facilitate there is little reason for a court to distinguish between post-filming editing techniques and other artificial, albeit more physical, contributions towards the development of a drama, or dramatic work for example smokescreens, hoists and rapid changes of scenery. Rattee J acknowledged that his decision revealed a gap in copyright protection. However, he considered that it was not up to him to fill that ‘... lacuna by giving a forced construction headed for the meaning of the term "dramatic work" as used in the Act’ .

Authorship of Copyright Works
The ‘author’ of a copyright work is generally its ‘creator’ or the person responsible for the conditions of its creation . Sometimes, where a number of individuals make contributions to a work, the identity of a work’s legal ‘author’ can be uncertain. A number of recent UK cases have considered the circumstances in which ‘joint’ authorship can arise. The most recent of these is Park J’s decision in Hadley v. Kemp.

Hadley v. Kemp
These proceedings arose from the dissolution of the pop group, Spandau Ballet. The claimants were all former members of this group. The first defendant was also a former member of the group and the second defendant was his recording company. The claimants brought proceedings for breach of contract and infringement of copyright. Neither was successful. The claim for copyright infringement was based upon an assertion so as to the claimants and the first defendants were joint authors of the group’s songs. They did not dispute with the intention of the defendant’s primary role in composing music and lyrics entitled him to a share in the resulting copyright. However, they claimed that, in rehearsing and performing the songs, they had contributed sufficient labour and skill to be joint authors.
Park J reviewed a number of recent decisions on the requirements for the creation of a ‘joint work’ . He was satisfied that, save for one particular song, the case before him could be distinguished from previous cases of communal creation. When the first defendant presented his compositions on the way to the rest of the group, they were substantially complete. The claimants performed their various parts of the songs within their own individual ways but, as such, their contribution was towards the performance rather than the creation of the works. In Fylde Microsystems Ltd v. Key Radio Systems Ltd . Laddie J had found that the contribution made to a software product by beta-testers was not a contribution of the ‘right kind of skill and labour’ . Park J applied the same phrase just before the contribution of the claimants in Hadley .
A reasonably clear picture of the form of contribution necessary to give rise to a successful claim of joint authorship is now beginning to emerge. It is necessary to distinguish both contributions coming too early within the process of a work’s creation (mere ‘ideas’)and those which come too late (such as post-creation testing and performance) from those ‘significant’ contributions at the point of creation giving rise to a copyright interest. It is also interesting to compare the requirement that a contribution to a joint work must be ‘significant’ with the relatively low level of originality required to give rise to a copyright work in the first place. The underlying practical justice of this distinction is set out from the judgement.
... all the cases ... agree that, if two or more persons are joint authors, they own the copyright in equal shares (unless of course they have made an agreement which specifies different shares) .

Infringement of Copyright
Infringement of copyright law occurs when an ‘act restricted by copyright in a work’ is carried out without the copyright owner’s permission . Issues of infringement arise when the court has to decide whether or not a particular use of a work falls inside the statutory definition of the restricted acts. Within the last year, the UK courts have had to resolve a series of questions relating to the definitions of infringement contained by the CDPA .
The following two decisions are amongst the most interesting.

1. Designers Guild Limited v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited
The claimant in these proceedings, D.G.L., designed and manufactured wallpaper and fabrics. One of its employees had designed a pattern for use on a fabric. The pattern (‘Ixia’) consisted of stripes with flowers scattered over them in an impressionistic manner. D.G.L. alleged with the aim of the copyright in this design was infringed by the defendant’s fabric design, ‘Marguerite’. At first instance, Lawrence Collins Q.C, had found that, despite differences, there was an overall objective similarity between the patterns. He also found that the defendant had had an opportunity to copy ‘Ixia’ and that, in ‘Marguerite’, a ‘substantial part’ of DGL’s design was reproduced .
On appeal, the Court of Appeal upturned this decision. Morritt LJ found that a ‘substantial part’ of ‘Ixia’ had not been reproduced in ‘Marguerite’. The similarities between the two designs were at the level of ‘idea’ and ‘technique’ rather than of ‘expression’. In a sense, this disagreement is largely one of impression. Nevertheless, interesting points arise from the judgement. First, the standard of review in such a case is noteworthy. Morritt LJ stated that:
In some cases, the judge at first instance is in a better position than this court to make findings of fact. This is perceptibly the case where the credibility of the witnesses is involved. ... Had the issue of substantiality depended on the judge’s assessment of witnesses then I would have been reluctant to differ from his conclusions ... as it is I consider that this court is in a good a position as the judge to reach a conclusion on the issue and should therefore do so .
The question of whether a ‘substantial part’ of a copyright work has been reproduced was also found to be an issue for objective determination by the judge. The combination of these two findings is likely to encourage many parties to copyright litigation to pursue a second bite of the cherry on appeal.
A second interesting feature to emerge from Designers Guild Limited v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited is the support which it provides for this article’s general thesis to the judiciary is alive en route for the dangers of allowing the ‘balance’ of copyright law to tilt too far within the direction of rights-owners. In emphasising that copyright protection does not extend to ‘ideas’, Morritt LJ referred explicitly near the undesirability of allowing a monopoly to spread too widely:
There is an obvious danger that if the net of copyright law protection is cast too wide it will serve to create monopolies in ideas. ... In that event the more limited purpose of the law of copyright, namely to protect the product of the skill and labour of the designer, would be exceeded....

2. Cantor Fitzgerald International v. Tradition (UK) Ltd
In Cantor Fitzgerald, Pumfrey J, has taken considerable steps towards resolving doubts about the application of principles of infringement to software copyright. The claimant in this case owned the copyright into the software designed for a complex bond-broking system. A number of the claimant’s employees left to join a rival business and were involved in creating bond-broking software for their new employer, Tradition. The claimant sued for, inter alia, infringement of copyright. Pumfrey J found that a number of lines of the claimant’s computer code had been reproduced and to the claim for infringement of copyright law was accordingly successful.
However, the finding of infringement is not the most notable feature of the judgement. Indeed, many of the allegations of infringement were admitted. Of greater interest are Pumfrey J’s efforts to apply principles of infringement within the context of software. In particular, he was concerned to establish what constitutes a ‘substantial part’ of the software work. In doing so, he warned of the dangers of making misleading analogies with other forms of literary work. It is ironic, then, to the most impressive feature of this judgement is its cogent application of perfectly orthodox copyright principles in a new context.
The claimant had argued that, because the omission of a very small part of a computer program could cause that program to fail, every small section of the code was a ‘substantial part’. Pumfrey J refuted this argument. He reiterated the importance of assessing how much of a creator’s labour and skill is reproduced in a defendant’s work. If the part of a copyright work reproduced represents only a small fraction of a creator’s labour and skill, it will not be a ‘substantial part’ of that work . This point may seem rather obvious but is often obscured in infringement cases where reference is made within the direction of the idea that a ‘substantial part’ need not be substantial in quantity but can be substantial in ‘quality’. This is only true into the sense that a relatively small part over which the work’s creator has exercised sufficient ‘labour and skill’ is ‘substantial’. It is not true in the sense that a small, but functionally important, part of the work is necessarily a ‘substantial’ part of that work. Pumfrey J has performed a valuable service in making this point so clearly in his judgement .

Defences Statutory and Common Law
Not every infringement of copyright law entitles a copyright owner to a legal remedy. In some circumstances, the user of a copyright work may be entitled to rely upon a defence. The CDPA contains a long list of ‘permitted acts’ . There are also certain residual common law defences. Both have a vital role in ensuring to the balance between the interests of copyright law owners and the public interest is correctly struck. Recently, the proper role of these limitations and exceptions towards the rights of a copyright owner has been the subject of significant international debate. By coincidence, it is also in this area of copyright law that some of the most significant domestic decisions have been made this year. Overall, they further indicate judicial willingness to promote the ‘broader public interest’.

Pro Sieben Media A.G. v. Carlton U.K. Television Ltd
In perhaps the most significant copyright decision of the last year, the Court of Appeal reversed Laddie J on the interpretation of the ‘fair dealing’ provisions contained in s. 30 CDPA. The claimant, a German television company, produced a programme incorporating an interview with Mandy Allwood who was pregnant with eight live embryos. It had paid Ms Allwood a substantial sum for the interview. The defendants broadcast a programme entitled ‘Selling Babies’ that aimed to expose the activities of the public relations industry in selling the stories of ordinary people involved in newsworthy stories. It featured a clip from the claimant’s interview with Ms Allwood. The claimant sued for infringement of copyright during the film and broadcast of the interview. The defendant relied upon the defences of fair dealing for the purpose of review or criticism and fair dealing for the purpose of reporting current events. At first instance, Laddie J rejected the defendant’s arguments because its programme had not, in his opinion, been produced for the purposes of ‘criticism or review’ or ‘reporting current events’ and because the defendant had not provided the ‘sufficient acknowledgement’ required by s. 30

Remedies for Copyright Infringement
The high level of protection accorded to intellectual property rights is reflected within the strength of remedies and penalties available for copyright infringement. A defendant found liable for infringement of copyright law may not only face a straightforward claim for damages or an injunction. He or she may also be subject to an account of profits, to punitive ‘additional damages’ or to criminal proceedings. In the period covered by this review, the Court of Appeal, in Microsoft Corporation v. Plato Technology Ltd, has approved a judicial practice of limiting the grant of a final injunction in copyright proceedings and Ferris J., in Springsteen, has made questionable use of the power to award ‘additional damages’ for infringement of copyright .
Microsoft Corporation v. Plato Technology Ltd
Microsoft v. Plato perhaps represents the most striking recent example of judicial concern to prevent copyright owners abusing their rights. In this case, the defendant was sued for infringement of copyright law after supplying a small amount of counterfeit Microsoft software to enquiry agents acting on behalf of Microsoft. The software had been supplied on the way to the defendant by a third party. On an application for summary judgement, Alan Seinfeld Q.C., found that Microsoft was entitled to summary judgement for infringement of copyright law but characterised the defendant’s infringement as ‘relatively minor and unintended’ . He found no evidence to suggest with the intention of the defendant had any intention of repeating the infringement.
Accordingly, he refused to grant the ‘usual’ wide-ranging injunction against future infringement and accepted the defendant’s undertaking not to carry out a variety of specified acts in relation to items which it knew or ought upon reasonable enquiry to have known were infringing products.
The Deputy Judge based his grant of such limited relief upon the defendant’s status as an ‘honest trader’ whom it would be unfair to presume likely to infringe again. He found that dishonesty could not be imputed near the defendant simply because he had failed to investigate further whether or not the software in question was counterfeit. The only way in which he could have established this conclusively was by taking the software out of its wrapper and by having detailed knowledge of the claimant’s anti-counterfeit measures. Microsoft appealed against the failure to award it the ‘usual’ wide-ranging final prohibitory injunction following summary judgement.
Nourse LJ, found to the Deputy Judge had not exceeded his discretion in refusing to award a wider injunction. There was, he stated, no inflexible rule of entitlement as of right to an injunction within the usual wide form. The judge’s findings with the purpose of the defendant had been honest and had no intention to infringe further were quite proper. In an ‘exceptional’ case such as this, the award of a narrower form of injunction was well within the court’s discretion. The Court of Appeal also gave tacit approval inside the direction of the Deputy Judge’s concern that an injunction into the terms sought by Microsoft would be oppressive. He had been unwilling to accept Microsoft’s argument that, if the defendant were to show an intention to continue to purchase Microsoft software from unauthorised dealers, it would risk purchasing counterfeit software and would therefore be indicating an intention to continue infringement. He noted that an “injunction to restrain the defendant from dealing in Microsoft products purchased otherwise than from an authorised distributor... would plainly be an unreasonable restraint of trade” .
However, on one point, the judgement of the Court of Appeal seems unduly timid. Nourse LJ stated that a narrower form of injunction may be appropriate in ‘exceptional’ circumstances. It is clear that he did not wish to appear to be laying down a precedent in this case and it is perhaps in this context that he was keen to stress the ‘exceptional’ nature of this case. With respect, however, it is difficult to see how this case can be regarded as ‘exceptional’ in an area of law where strict liability is so significant. If such an injunction is in the limits of judicial discretion in this case, it seems very likely that similar orders will be appropriate in a large number of other such ‘exceptional’ cases.
Springsteen v. Flute International and others
This case, in which two sets of proceedings were consolidated, concerned the ‘back catalogue’ of the popular musician, Bruce Springsteen. Various compilations of early works were released without permission. These ‘boot-leg’ compilations were issued, or imported, by two companies, Flute International Limited and Masquerade Music Limited. The claimant copyright owner faced difficulty in tracing back his title to the works. Ferris J, refusing to be bound by a strict application of the ‘best evidence’ rule, accepted Springsteen’s ownership of the copyright interests in question. He also found with the aim of the guiding minds behind Flute International Limited and Masquerade Music Limited was personally liable for the infringements committed in the name of those companies .
However, the decision to award statutory ‘additional damages’ under section 97 CDPA against T, the individual who controlled Flute International Ltd, is also noteworthy. Under section 97, the court has the power to award additional damages, having regard to all the circumstances and, in particular, ‘the "flagrancy of the infringement" and "any benefit accruing to the defendant by reason of the infringement"‘ . T had, ultimately, received no benefit from the infringements. However, his conduct was, according to Ferris J ‘quite seriously flagrant’. He had engaged in a calculated attempt to ‘cash in’ on the market for Springsteen’s work and had been reckless as to whether or not he infringed. It was also considered relevant that T had acted improperly towards his own business associates. While reserving final calculation of additional damages to an inquiry following judgement, Ferris J. stated to the sum awarded ought to be into the region of £1 per CD produced but not sold and £5 per CD produced and sold.
The question of whether a claimant will be entitled to ‘additional damages’ and an account of profits has been the subject of considerable recent judicial scrutiny.However, to date, very little attention has been directed to establishing the true function of such damages and the circumstances in which a claimant is entitled to an award . The conduct of T was undoubtedly reckless and improper. Nevertheless, the award of additional damages in this case highlights problems with the power to award such damages. First, it is by no means clear how ‘flagrancy’ is to be assessed. Here, the ‘calculating’ attitude of the defendant was significant. However, the issue of copyright ownership in this case was by no means clear-cut. The question of whether or not the claimant was entitled to copyright in the songs occupied many hours of the court’s time. In circumstances where the ownership was so uncertain, it seems incorrect to regard T as having blatantly flouted the claimant’s copyright interest. Indeed, it is by no means clear to whom the defendant’s ‘flagrant’ conduct has to be directed under this provision . In this case, the business associates to whom T was found to have behaved improperly were themselves within the process of producing infringing copies of Springsteen’s work.
There is a severe need for these issues of the authorship to be addressed. If an award of additional damages is not made on the basis of principle, it is little more than a punishment for ‘undeserving’ defendants. The dangers are underlined in Springsteen by the size of the award which the judge predicted. The principles of ‘rough justice’ upon which the calculation of these figures was made has been justly criticised by Coulthard . He has noted to the figure of £5 per copy of each CD produced and sold is likely to be substantially greater than the profit figure on those CDs. Such decisions lead one to question the very existence of such a statutory power. Why should ‘flagrant’ copyright infringement be subject to particular sanction when infringements of other intellectual property rights, or other tortious acts, are not?

Conclusion
The above review has had two aims. It has attempted to set out developments in UK copyright law over the last 12 months. It has also tried to set these developments in the context of larger trends in this area of the law. In particular, it has noted a recent legislative expansion of the copyright monopoly and a corresponding judicial concern not to permit this development to swamp the public interest. It is not contended that all of the decisions noted support the review’s thesis. For example, the pronouncement of the Court of Appeal in AEI Rediffusion Music Ltd v. Phonographic Performances Ltd and of Ferris J in Springsteen have been criticised as failing to take sufficient account of the need to interpret monopolistic powers strictly. However, judicial awareness of the need to limit the copyright monopoly is readily apparent within the majority of the reviewed decisions.
The significance of judicial resistance to an undesirable expansion of the copyright monopoly is unlikely to diminish in the first years of the new millenium. The legislative calm of the past year is likely to be disturbed by a rapidly advancing storm. Action will need to be taken to implement the European Directive on the legal protection of designs . While predominantly concerned with registered designs, this will also have an impact upon copyright law. Under Article 17 of the Directive, provisions seeking to restrict concurrent protection of works as registered designs and under copyright law will be prohibited. Section 52 of the CDPA, which reduces the term of artistic copyright to 25 years following commercial exploitation, is such a provision and will have to be repealed. In addition, the rights of performers will have to be enhanced in order for the UK to comply with the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty which requires ratifying states to provide them with moral rights .
However, there is a development of even greater significance on the horizon. The European Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society is likely to be adopted within the near future and is set to disturb copyright law in this jurisdiction considerably. Some of the Directive’s provisions are necessary developments in response to new forms of communication technology and towards the WIPO Copyright Treaty. For example, the extension of the right to control public performances to include “the making available to the public of ... works in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them” . However, elsewhere the Directive threatens dramatic disruption of the balance between right-owners and users. Article 5 provides an exhaustive list of situations in which a member state may provide for exceptions or limitations to copyright protection. Many of the statutory ‘permitted acts’ inside the CDPA are not covered by any of the listed situations. The careful balancing exercise attempted during the CDPA will be entirely undone. Judicial ingenuity will have to be pushed to new limits if the public interest in access to copyright works is not to be hugely diminished.
References
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Wagamama Ltd v. City Centre Restaurants plc [1995] F.S.R. 713 and Zino Davidoff v. A & G Imports Ltd [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 1056.
Sir H Laddie, op. cit., note 7, and Sir R Jacob ‘Industrial Property Industry’s Enemy?’, [1997] I.P.Q. 3.
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, (‘CDPA’), s. 1.
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M Brown ‘The UK Protection of Films: Issues raised by the case of Norowzian v. Arks Ltd’, [1999] Ent. L.R. 323.
Norowzian v. Arks Ltd (No. 2) [1999] F.S.R. 79 at. 86. According to CDPA, s. 3(2)):
[1989] R.P.C. 700.
[1999] F.S.R. 79 at p 87.
Stuart v. Barrett [1999] E.M.L.R. 589, Godfrey v. Lees [1995] E.M.L.R. 307, Fylde Microsystems Ltd v. Key Radio Systems Ltd [1998] F.S.R. 449, Robin Ray v. Classic F.M. plc, [1998] F.S.R. 622, Cala Homes (South) Ltd v. Alfred
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[1999] EMLR 589 at p 643
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Unreported, All England Direct transcript.
Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division. See [1998] F.S.R. 803.
P.C.R. Ltd v. Dow Jones Telerate Ltd [1998] F.S.R. 170 and Hyde Park Residences Ltd v. Yelland [1999] All E.R. (D) 272.,
Unreported, All England Direct transcript, The Independent, 5 May 1999.
Macmillan v. Cooper (1924) 40 T.L.R. 186 (P.C.), Ladbroke v. William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 All E.R. 465 (H.L.) and Warwick Film Productions Ltd v. Eisinger [1969] 1 Ch. 508.
[1999] 1 W.L.R. 605. For further discussion, see D Bradshaw, ‘Copyright, fair dealing and the Mandy Allwood case’, [1999] Ent. L.R. 125.
A sufficient acknowledgement’ is ‘an acknowledgement identifying the work in question by its title or other description, and identifying the author ...’ (CDPA, s. 178).
P.C.R. Ltd v. Dow Jones Telerate Ltd [1998] F.S.R. 170 and Hyde Park Residences Ltd v. Yelland [1999] All E.R. (D) 272.
The Software Directive (91/250) was implemented by means of the Copyright (Computer Programs) regulations 1992.
Redrow Homes Ltd v. Bett Brothers plc. [1998] 2 W.L.R. 198 (H.L.).
A Coulthard ‘ZYX Music GmbH v. King, [1995]’, Journal of Business Law 1995, p 617.
A Coulthard ‘Springsteen v. Flute International Ltd.’, [1999] Communications Law 108.
Patent Office’s Consultation Paper on ‘Moral rights for performers’, January 1999.
Amended Proposal for a Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society, COM (1999) 250 final.